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(b)(3), (b)(6)

3 January 2008

Embassy Annex, International Zone, Baghdad

by (b)(3), (b)(6)

MNFI Historian

Interviewers Comments: (b)(3), (b)(6) *discussed the handful of projects his cell overseas along with the terrain on the borders with Syria and Iran.*

(b)(3), (b)(6) acknowledged the interview belongs to U.S. Central Command

(b)(3), (b)(6) handles small, niche projects. In the last six month, they've handled three key operations.

1.4a, 1.4g,

~~(S//REL US MCFI)~~ Handle MNFI efforts for the TIFRIC (Theater Internment Facility Reconstruction ??) under construction for TF 1.4a by the GRD. H handles personnel issues for two, one in Taiji and Ramadi. He works out life support issues and requirements for detainees, coalition forces, support services, handling instructors, everything. He works on projecting the likely size of the detainee population. The effort in Taiji is on track for September 2009. It is complementary to the enhanced release process for detainees. It is a goal-oriented process. The MNFI goal is to reduce the detainee population from its current 25K to under 20K by April 2008. Actual reductions depend on progress in the security situation, checks and balances, and tempering releases to ensure the system is working. They have to ensure MNFI participation in the release boards and the ability of local communities to absorb released detainees, and ensure the economy will employ them. A complimentary effort is to inform the SPA effort to identify the size of the detainee population expected in December 2008 in preparation for the US and Iraq and the Status of Forces Agreement going into effect in 2009. We have to figure out what the authorities will be, how will we dispose of various detainees, and what or who can we turn over to GOI control, whether GoI will grant or accept general amnesty, GoI facilities, and Iraqi capacity requirements.

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(U) Use of Biometrics. We have a strategic effects biometrics cell, but it has not been resourced for over six months. It is an additional duty, and requires a five-person cell. The services have determined they can't fill it. As a result, we are collapsing the MNFI effort into the MNCI effort. Theater lead thus resorts to Corps. StratOps will retain policy oversight and training. We've focused on pre-deployment training and how it supports the mission, the complexity of the systems architecture. We've done some work to help CF exchange biometrics files with GoI, MoI, for injection into fingerprint database. We've been involved in the introduction of biometrics at ports of entry, borders of Syria and Iran. We have screened 100% of military aged males crossing those entry points since August 2007. We will expand the system as personnel capacity improves. Right now, we lack the personnel we need for it. We have done a Joint Operational Urgent Needs statement for contractors to do the biometrics screening.

(U) Planned the transition of the International Zone from MNCI control to Joint Area Support Group Center. Effective 6 January.

In July and August, we were getting IDF on a weekly basis. It has tapered off significantly since September. Overall security has improved, and numbers of coalition forces wounded and killed is greatly reduced. ISF casualties are down, and Iraqi civilian casualties are down.

Improved security was vital for both issues one and two above; we could not do either without better security, and we need sufficient force and stability to do both safely. Detainee releases depend on conditions of the operating environment and the ability to integrate. We have opportunities to change their circumstances, so we're trying to change the money or the threat equation that leads them to attacking us. We're trying to replace bad influences with good ones.

TIFRIC is a rehab program using local clerics and community leaders to visit detainees. Create vocational opportunities and educational opportunities. A religious program uses moderate clerics to counter AQI ideology.

Terrain:

(b)(3), (b)(6) has been out to Husayba on the Syrian border. It was harsh desert, isolated communities along highways and water sources. It was a large town and looked urban, astride the borders. Economic flow is important to Iraq and Syria. There is a CF operating base on the border. Marines are there daily with people, the Port of Entry team, and Iraqis.

Up on the Iranian border, the terrain was very flat, not so much desert. It appeared that the area had once thrived with farming, irrigation ditches, and aqueducts. Zirbatiya is not an urban area. It is isolated, has a major highway, and there were many fuel trucks. Empty ones were headed into Iran, cargo was coming back into Iraq. Several thousands

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of people were coming and going across the border. It had a US Port of Entry transition team along with an Iraqi outpost.

Tuwaitha is 18km southeast of Baghdad. Small urban towns around it, and it is just outside a populated area. It is a large complex with 50' high berms--buildings destroyed by Israelis or CF in 1991. Much building structure is in significant disrepair and has seen a lot of looting and pillaging.

Approved for Release

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